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Shelley’s Defences of Poetry1 
 
Michael O’Neill 
Durham University  
 
Percy Bysshe Shelley (1792-1822) was a poet who possessed, in his own words, “the power 
of communicating and receiving  intense and impassioned conceptions respecting man and 
nature.” 2  Yet the greatness of his poetry, this essay will argue, does not essentially reside in 
his capacity to articulate  his strong libertarian beliefs.  These beliefs may be the ground of 
his conscious intellectual being.  They show the influence of many thinkers, including that 
enshrined in the Enquiry Concerning Political Justice (1793), written by his father-in- law, 
William Godwin. But the supposition that Shelley uses poetry as the vehicle for the 
endorsement of a system of ideas is fundamentally erroneous, as he himself argues in two 
important places for understanding his poetics:  the Preface to Prometheus Unbound, where 
he asserts that “Didactic poetry is my abhorrence” (232) and A Defence of Poetry, where he 
develops a sophisticated theory of poetry’s primary appeal to the imagination and argues that 
“A Poet ... would do ill to embody his own conceptions of right and wrong, which are usually 
those of his place and time, in his poetical creations, which participate in neither” (682). 
 
 Shelley’s importance and achievement as a poet derive from the way in which he tests, 
dramatises, anatomizes and enacts the processes involved in belief or, indeed, doubt.  He 
turns out, surprisingly given the terms of his reputation as a poet hurrying always to exalt 
principles of liberty, love, and equality, to be one of the major exemplars of Keats’s ideal of 
“Negative Capability” (Keats Letters 1. 193).  Shelley is often prepared to open his poetry to 
differing interpretations, to allow the reader’s mind to be the final courtroom of the poetry’s 
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appeal.  The Poet of Alastor (1816), Shelley’s enigmatic poem of driven and disappointed 
quest, might illustrate the dangers of what in the poem’s Preface is described as “self-centred 
seclusion” (92).  But the poem’s narrative form prevents any simply moralistic reading from  
enjoying un-interrogated sway. Told by a Narrator, who expresses deep admiration for the 
Poet as a “surpassing  Spirit” (714), and whose unsatisfied longing for communion with 
nature tallies with the Poet’s failed attempt to find an embodied form of the “veilèd maid” 
(151) of a particularly vivid dream, Alastor ricochets  between unconvinced acceptance of 
“Nature’s vast frame” (719) and despairing longing for something beyond “Art and 
eloquence, / And all the shows ’o the world” (710-11).  It comes to a close without closing 
off an openness to all that resists final closure. 
 
As in many of Shelley’s poems, the ambiguities of Alastor owe much to Shelley’s complex 
response to a precursor poet, in this case Wordsworth, whose solemnly melodious blank 
verse and themes of solitude and relationship with nature in The Excursion and Tintern Abbey 
provide the frame within and against which the younger poet works.  Shelley’s dealings with 
Wordsworth are not merely antagonistic.  He may question aspects of the older poet’s creed 
and perceived ideology.  Yet Shelley’s poetic remodelling implies the importance of 
Wordsworth’s mode of vision.  Wordsworth is probing central questions, even if his answers 
do not compel Shelley’s assent.  Wordsworth is the precursor brought to mind yet redefined 
in two major shorter poems written the year Alastor was published:  “Hymn to Intellectual 
Beauty” and “Mont Blanc.”  In the former, Shelley is at once the radical atheist of The 
Necessity of Atheism (1811) and the Notes to the early Queen Mab (1813) who contends that 
“Every reflecting mind must acknowledge that there is no proof of the existence of a Deity” 
(81) and the visionary individualist who redefines “God” in his unfinished On Christianity.  
There, Shelley reprises a central conviction of the “Hymn to Intellectual Beauty” when he 
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writes:  “There is a power by which we are surrounded, like the atmosphere in which some 
motionless lyre is suspended, which visits with its breath our silent chords, at will” (Shelley 
Prose 251). If “intellectual beauty” is experienced within the mind, its ultimate source may 
be intra- or extra-human (“visits” and “power” lend support to the latter possibility), and is 
certainly beyond what in A Defence of Poetry Shelley calls “the determination of the will” 
(696).   
 
The “Hymn” creates a lyric form that in its longer and shorter lines, and subtle rhyming, 
mimes the coming and going of the “Power” and the waxing and waning of the poet’s 
confidence.  It plays its own variations on Wordsworth’s theme of visionary loss and 
subsequent recovery in his “Ode: Intimations of Immortality.”  Whereas Wordsworth writes a 
poetry of plangent lament, Shelley, as he switches in his third stanza, say, from deriding 
orthodox “Frail spells” to launching his own “Frail spell” in the direction of  “Thy light 
alone” (29, 32) displays a beautifully unprotected abruptness.  The unadvertised swiftness of 
movement from scepticism to self-generated faith is typical of the drama going on in and 
animating his poetry. In “Mont Blanc” (version A), he again brings Wordsworth to mind, and 
“The everlasting universe of things” (1) that “Rolls through the mind” seems to participate in 
the “motion and a spirit” (102) that “rolls through all things” (103) in Tintern Abbey (quoted 
from Gill (ed.)).  But if Wordsworth celebrates  “a sense sublime / Of something far more 
deeply interfused”  (96-7), Shelley offers a warier, more sceptical view.. And yet at the 
poem’s close, responding to his own more deeply  sustained sense of the mind’s power 
(shown in the echoes of Coleridge’s “Kubla Khan” at the close of section 4, echoes that offset 
the grimmer naturalism of preceding lines), Shelley suggests the dependence of any sense of 
sense on “the human mind’s imaginings” (143). 
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Shelley is a poet of emotional and conceptual extremes conveyed in verse of great distinction, 
force and subtlety. He is a poet of desire, of the longing for change, for “some world far from 
ours” (“To Jane [‘The keen stars were twinkling’]” 21-22) that is our world redeemed. But he 
is also a poet who writes compellingly about all that thwarts desire. He is to his fingertips a 
poet of criss-crossing perspectives; if his poetry “enlarges the circumference of the 
imagination by replenishing it with thoughts of ever new delight” (Defence of Poetry 682), it 
continually attunes itself to what in the Preface to The Cenci he calls “sad reality” (314). 
“Two Spirits: An Allegory,” for all (or possibly because of) its editorial quandaries, is a 
quintessential Shelleyan lyric of divided impulses. The poem exists only as a rough draft with 
multiple cancellations and unclear indications in places of final or near-final choices, but 
what is manifest is that it has found  a precise lyric configuration of its own, in its stanzaic 
structure, rhymes, and images.  Although the poem dramatizes the clash between caution and 
idealistic desire, it immediately complicates both positions; the First Spirit warns but sees the 
lure of desire; the second persists in desire, but sees the dangers he is facing. The poem sets 
exalted terror against exhilarated commitment to “the flood of the tempest dark” (26), and 
arrives, in its coda, at a fine balance between suggestions of loss and recovery.  It ends with a 
“traveller” (43) who “awakes on the fragrant grass” (47) and “finds night day” (48), just 
tilting the poem towards a residual trust in the heart’s best hopes, even as it characteristically 
puts the reader on the spot, implicitly asking him or her why ”day” and “night” should be 
invested with stable and hierarchical symbolic significances.  
 
Something comparable occurs at the close of “Ode to the West Wind,” Shelley’s major short 
poem. There, Shelley concludes his wrestling with the angel of the wind,  at once verbally 
embodied “breath of Autumn’s being” (2), and image of revolutionary inspiration,  by 
shaping an apparently rhetorical question out of the final couplet of the five that turn 
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headlong terza rima invocations and pleadings into vertiginous sonnets.  Apparently 
rhetorical, since Shelley prompts the reader to ask why there is any reason other than human 
desire that the spiritual, poetic, and political should model their processes of change on those 
evident in the cycles of the seasons.  The compulsion to honour the drive towards betterment 
impels the poem through its progressive uncovering of the poet’s “sore need” (52), a need for 
the wind’s revivifying power to re-animate his words.  In the last section, the poet rises, 
phoenix-like, out of the ashes of his sprawled abasement at the hand of chastising experience, 
experience that forces him to exclaim, “I fall upon the thorns of life! I bleed!” (54). True to 
the reversals and shifts that make the ode a record of shaped but inwardly conflicted struggle 
rather than a polemical exhortation, Shelley, in this last section, pleads with the wind in such 
a way that plea becomes  impassioned command.  He cries:  “Drive my dead thoughts over 
the universe / Like withered leaves to quicken a new birth” (63-4).  The lines concoct their 
own, very Shelleyan blend of pathos and power, out of their  ability to combine assertion, 
evident in the strong stress on “Drive,” with awareness of failure, seen in the reference to 
“dead thoughts,” and hope for the future, shown in the reference to the emphasized “new 
birth.”   
 
“Ode to the West Wind” wishes to “Scatter” (66) the poet’s “words among mankind” (67), 
literally to disseminate them, “Ashes and sparks” (67) that will, the poem hopes, have the 
effect that, in A Defence of Poetry¸ Shelley ascribes to Dante’s work and all “high poetry”: a 
capacity to serve as prompts to “inextinguishable thought” (693).  This sense of poetry as 
working on the reader’s imagination is the spring of Shelley’s poetic practice in Prometheus 
Unbound.  It is not enough, for example, for us to dismiss Jupiter as “the tyrant of the world” 
(3. 4. 183); through Prometheus’ double-signifying “recalling” of his curse, we have to 
recognise how tyranny takes two to dance its savage tango.  The very hatred and contempt 
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which Prometheus expresses towards Jupiter establish the two figures as caught up in a 
strangely twinned alliance, from which Prometheus can only break once he realizes the 
psychodynamics of his dependence on hatred.  At the same time, enslaving as hatred can be, 
its expression is also a necessary first step in the eventual liberation imagined in the lyrical 
drama. As it moves beyond the rocky dungeon of the Caucasus, Prometheus Unbound 
continually appeals to the reader’s desire to imagine the new, the transfigured, the yet to be.  
It does so through lyrical measures that appeal to yet brilliantly frustrate and redirect the 
senses into “thought’s wildernesses” (1. 742), as in the “Life of Life!” (2. 5. 48) lyric chanted 
by a “Voice in the Air” to the transformed Asia; through dialogic scenes, as when Asia 
catechizes Demogorgon about the origins of evil in 2. 5; through verse whose negations 
memorably allow the altered and the old to occupy the same poetic space, as when the Spirit 
of the Hour proclaims that after the fall of Jupiter and the coming of a renovated world “None 
wrought his lips in truth-entangling lines” (3. 4. 142); and through visions whose re-
organizing energy seems to mime the work of the imagination itself, as when Panthea in Act 
4 depicts the earth as a “multitudinous Orb” (253) that “Grind the bright brook into an azure 
mist / Of elemental subtlety, like light” (254-5).  That “azure mist / Of elemental subtlety” 
has a self-reflexive dimension and might describe the vision to which the poem tends.  Yet, 
even at the end, Demogorgon is at hand to advise of the need, should tyranny return, “to 
hope, till Hope creates / From its own wreck the thing it contemplates” (4. 573-4); pushed 
into the rhyme position,  “creates” assumes a special, self-generating heroism. 
 
At the same time, in the roughly contemporaneous Julian and Maddalo, the Shelleyan 
surrogate Julian asserts, “Where is the love, beauty and truth we seek / But in our mind?” 
(374-5), only to be told by his friend and intellectual adversary, the Byronic Maddalo, “You 
talk Utopia” (179).  The poem, subtitled “A Conversation,” uses its deftly modulating, 
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frequently enjambed couplets to create a poem of gripping interest. If we sway between 
Julian’s optimism and Maddalo’s electrifyingly authoritative pessimism, we are also taken in 
the depths of  a third speaker’s mind, the Maniac.  Torn between a desire to repress and speak 
of emotional trauma, the Maniac speaks  “Of the mind’s hell” (441).  He does so in tones that 
veer between near-paranoia and the confessionally anguished, even as he asserts that “to 
myself I do not wholly owe / What now I suffer” (321-2).  The very syntax of that phrasing 
suggests the difficulty of understanding the self (and others).  It is a difficulty enacted with 
great humaneness by a poem that at its close places us uncomfortably close to “the cold 
world” which “shall not know” (617), Julian decides, what happened between the Maniac and 
his Lady. 
 
The libertarian hopefulness that is apparent in the Prometheus Unbound volume of 1820 
concedes that hope’s major guarantor is hope itself, a state inseparable from  self-aware 
commitment to the imagination. In later poems Shelley gives greater prominence to the 
potentially perilous nature of the imagination.  The Triumph of Life, the poem on which he 
was working at the time of his death by drowning, uses its Dantescan form, a dream-vision in 
fluid terza rima, to reassess the gap between aspiration and reality, between what “glimmers”  
as possibilities (see lines 33 and 431, and what appears to erase such possibilities.  Different 
lights blaze, shine, and gleam through the poem, now evoking the stars that give some form 
of approach to hope, now suggesting the ordinary light of the sun that threatens to obliterate 
star-light, and now describing the blinding glare cast by the Car (or chariot) in which the 
ominous figure of Life sits.  Over and over, history presents the poet-narrator with the 
spectacle of good undoing itself; life overcomes virtually all who live with the exceptions, it 
would seem, of Jesus and Socrates, exemplary figures who fled back to their “native noon” 
(131).  In the midst of this desolate vision, the poet-narrator meets Rousseau, kindler of 
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revolutionary flames, and author of idealising erotic fiction and anguished confession, and 
through Rousseau’s narrative we are offered, in condensed symbolic form, a version of the 
archetypal Romantic figure.  Like Shelley and Byron, in their different ways, Rousseau has 
“suffered what [he] wrote, or viler pain!” (279).   Rousseau’s account of his encounter with 
the “shape all light” (352) reruns yet looks freshly at Shelley’s career-long pursuit of ideals; 
the shape’s muse-like quality suggests that whatever drives the poetic imagination may be 
disturbingly ambivalent. Yet what the shape is or stands for we find hard finally to tell; what 
we do know is what Rousseau experiences; and what he experiences, an experience in which 
the shape seems to blot out his thoughts, yet vanishes until she becomes a yearned-for, 
glimmering absence, he does not fully understand; and the poetry is able to evoke this 
incomplete understanding with ruthlessly vigilant empathy. 
 
Shelley, then, is a poet who knows that many readers (and perhaps an aspect of himself) 
would agree with Maddalo that he “talk[s] Utopia”: he makes poetic capital out of this 
knowledge by allowing for alternative perspectives (as in Julian and Maddalo), or by coming 
at his obsessions from unusual, re-invigorating angles. The Witch of Atlas, for instance, a 
poem of prodigal, bewitchingly comic fantasy,  almost sends up the typical Shelleyan 
concern with a veiled ideal, when it describes the witch weaving a veil that will serve as “A 
shadow for the splendour of her love” (152). Shelley is not a poet who writes the same poem 
over and over; his poems are particular and differentiated, and subtly alert to their own mode 
of being. So Prometheus Unbound explores its own particular world in Act I, when Earth 
speaks of a shadow-world that includes “Dreams and the light imaginings of men, / And all 
that faith creates or love desires” (200-01). That first line momentarily stands at an angle to 
the lyrical drama, itself an embodiment of “Dreams and the light imaginings of men,” even as 
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the next line switches perspective, and mounts an implicitly strong defence of “All that faith 
creates.” 
  
Nor would it be right to ignore the various plausible poets we can extract from the overall 
oeuvre.  There is Walter Bagehot’s Shelley, a poet of “peculiar removed essences of lyrical 
rapture” (Bagehot, 4.121). There is the tough-minded, politically radical Shelley, idealistic, 
yet aware of “the unbending realities of actual life” (A Philosophical View of Reform 664). 
And there is the deconstructive Shelley decentering centres, calling into question all essences. 
These Shelleys overlap. “The Cloud” combines playful lyric mythmaking with contemporary 
scientific knowledge to produce a poem which comes at its big themes lightly. In the last 
lines of “The Cloud”, “convex” (79) is right for an observer looking down at the earth’s 
atmosphere; the point brings out the “peculiar removed” position of the cloud, a speaker who 
stands apart from the human and yet who is at the same time turned by the jauntily anapaestic 
verse into something like the elusive principle of life itself. The cloud is turned too, into a 
symbol of libertarian hope, with its refusal to be squashed, and of the imagination, with its 
capacity for transformation. In its light-hearted yet triumphant way “The Cloud” answers the 
riddle of mutability which haunts the Prometheus Unbound volume. In that volume Shelley 
comes up in “The Sensitive Plant” with the seemingly Platonic assertion that “For love, and 
beauty, and delight, / There is no death nor change” (Conclusion, 21-22).  “The Sensitive 
Plant” has, by this stage, turned from enchanting if tremulous fable into vividly relished 
nightmare; beauty has been destroyed in the third part, and Shelley’s response is to create 
from its wreckage a knowingly fictive and “modest creed” (Conclusion 13) based in the fact 
that “nothing is, but all things seem” (Conclusion 11). Riskily and affectingly he removes 
himself, or appears to remove himself, from the world of process which in “The Cloud” he 
10 
 
celebrates.  “I change but cannot die” (“The Cloud” 76) strikes a note which, for all its 
playfulness, is at the centre of Shelley’s view of life and poetry.  
 
Yet the longing for a state of certainty beyond process is typical too, and out of that quarrel 
will emerge much of the drama that animates the concluding section of Adonais, Shelley’s 
elegy for Keats.  In that poem, the desire to affirm that an imagined absolute (“The One”) is 
superior to experienced process is seemingly strong, as when Shelley asserts that “The One 
remains, the many change and pass; / Heaven’s light forever shines, Earth’s shadows fly; / 
Life, like a dome of many-coloured glass, /Stains the white radiance of Eternity, / until Death 
tramples it to fragments.” (460-4). In fact, the quotation reveals how Shelley moves beyond 
and away from the tone of calm philosophical statement of the opening line.  The famous 
image brings with it fraught complexities, brought to a focus in the emphasis placed on the 
pivotal verb “Stains.” If life disfigures “the white radiance of Eternity,” another meaning of 
the verb acknowledges that life also enriches the radiance.  Death may destroy the screen 
between us and the white radiance, yet its trampling brutalism cannot but elicit a degree of 
flinching; suddenly the “many-coloured dome” possesses a fragile beauty.  In keeping with 
this compelling dramatization of to-and-fro impulses, Shelley asks apparently rhetorical 
questions that turn out not be rhetorical at all (see lines 459 and 469), and finally depicts 
himself as questing after an absolute which he seems forever fated not to reach, as he is 
“borne darkly, fearfully, afar” (492). 
  
In its final resurrection the cloud says, “I arise and unbuild it [i.e. the blue dome of air which 
is its cenotaph] again” (“The Cloud” 84). “[U]nbuilding” is a crucial activity in Shelley’s 
work, which decreates in order to recreate, and bears on the vexed and rich question of 
Shelleyan belief. Should one, for instance, we see the Power of “Mont Blanc”, the One in 
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Adonais and, say, Liberty in “Ode to Liberty” as secularized mirror images of the God of 
Christian theology?  The answer must surely be “no” to the degree that Shelley’s affirmations 
are acutely aware of their fictional status.  Shelleyan answers are imaginatively created and 
dynamically provisional, as when we are told how,  “burning through the inmost veil of 
Heaven, / The soul of Adonais, like a star, / Beacons from the abode where the Eternal are” 
(Adonais 493-95).  The poem may end with the word “are”, a word suggestive of being, but it 
ends too with a typical hint of veils within veils; if the poems glimpses what it would be like 
to abide with Adonais, it knows too that there are miles to go before it sleeps.  
 
When “Liberty” is invoked as “Thou heaven of earth!” (“Ode to Liberty” 166), the phrasing 
uses religious language to enforce its humanist and historical view that Liberty exists only as 
realized by human beings within particular societies. But Shelley’s humanism sees no reason 
why it should deny itself the intensity of feeling often associated with religion. In 
Epipsychidion Shelley borrows religious language to describe the idealized “Emily” in the 
passage beginning “The glory of her being, issuing thence, / Stains the dead, blank, cold air 
with a warm shade / Of unentangled intermixture, made / By Love, of light and motion” (91-
3), and  proceeding to an intuition of “one intense / Diffusion, one serene Omnipresence” 
(93-4).  Throughout the poem, Shelley is aware, like T. S. Eliot’s Sweeney, that he has   
“gotta use words” (Eliot 135) and he continually confronts the limits of expression.  Yet here, 
as elsewhere, his sense of language’s limitations frustrates much less than it enables his 
poetry.  He may have jotted, at the end of his essay “On Love”, that “These words inefficient 
and metaphorical—Most words so—No help—” (Major Works 821, n. 632). Yet the fact that 
words are “metaphorical” is one way he finds of freeing himself from their traditional 
associations; so in the Epipsychidion passage, the process of redefinition works so 
bewilderingly and yet purposefully that we have, in reading, to give up the notion that we can 
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identify Emily by seeing her as a solely a person or merely an idea (such as an incarnation of 
Intellectual Beauty;]the way she is described, rather, illustrates Shelley’s point that the poetry 
seeks to mark the “before unapprehended relations of things” (A Defence of Poetry 676). The 
poetry involves the reader in the process of seeking to comprehend how Emily can be 
“Scarce visible from extreme loveliness” (104), even as we are instructed to “See where she 
stands!” (112), an instruction that demands we see through, not simply with, the eye. Or, as 
Harold Bloom puts the matter memorably, “The problem is to describe a secularized 
epiphany that cannot be described, but Shelley was a specialist in the indescribable” (Bloom 
51).  Indeed, as he presents “a mortal shape indued / With love and life and light and deity” 
(112-13), Shelley even prompts to us to redefine our understanding of what a “secularized 
epiphany” might be.  All categories are under something close to assault through a use of 
words whose micro-behaviours conduce towards erosion of separating barriers; so, here, the 
assonance involved in the last three nouns persuades them to co-habit a newly existing space.   
  
It is pointless for the critic to reproach Shelley, as F. R. Leavis did, for failing to possess a 
firm grip on the actual since for Shelley the actual does not exist until defined in the light of 
the mind’s sense of its potential (194).  In Shelley’s greatest poetry his terms bear witness to 
his attempt to redefine; so in the passage just referred to from Epipsychidion  familiar 
abstractions take on new life, coming together, briefly, into an original “intermixture,” which 
both reflects “The glory of her being” and is only a staining of it.  The passage sets going a 
characteristic and energizing friction between the sense  (just round the corner here: see 123 
and following lines) that words are inadequate and that they can, at full stretch, just glimpse 
what it is they wish to say, between the impulse to come to rest on some assured absolute 
(here “that Beauty,” 102) and the swerving away from that, between the poetic self-
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consciousnesss and the other-awareness which coalesce in a phrase such as “Scarce visible 
from extreme loveliness” (104) which describes the poem and “The glory of her being.”  
  
Such an emphasis on self-aware fictionality makes Shelley a Romantic forerunner of Wallace 
Stevens. Shelley is never so coolly dandified as the poet who writes, “The final belief is to 
believe in a fiction, which you know to be a fiction, there being nothing else. The exquisite 
truth is to know that it is a fiction and that you believe in it willingly” (Stevens 163). But the 
poet who ends “Mont Blanc” with a question that lays the burden for making meaning on 
“the human mind’s imaginings” (143), who at the end of “The Sensitive Plant”  offers us an 
extremely immodest assertion in the form of a modest creed we might find pleasant to 
consider, who in mid-course in Adonais revises a previous stanza’s doubt to assert that the 
dead Keats “is not dead, he doth not sleep” (343), who argues that the “desire to be for ever 
as we are . . . is  . . . the secret persuasion which has given birth to the opinion of a future 
state” (133 rev) and who in a note to “Hellas” says that it is the poet’s province “to attach 
himself to those ideas which exalt and ennoble humanity” (Major Works 585), has little to 
learn from Stevens about fictiveness. Yet Shelley does not, for all his scepticism and self-
awareness about the workings of desire, abandon the idea that there is possibly a true state of 
things whose light exceeds the might of our obscure organs. Thus, the close of Epipsychidion 
leaves unresolved whether the failure of the poet’s quest to ascend “Into the height of love’s 
rare Universe” (589) can be laid at the door of language’s inadequacy to do justice to the 
concept of some ineffable union, or whether the notion of some such union can only ever be 
asserted, never wholly and fully experienced. 
 
It is, however, for the daring and originality with which Shelley’s poems explore the 
possibilities of poetry that they claim our admiration.  Their generic experimentation is 
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central to this daring and originality.  Shelley remodels many forms, producing in Hellas, for 
instance, his second major example of a lyrical drama, which draws on Greek classical 
practice (Aeschylus’s The Persians) to produce a poem that speaks to the immediate 
historical present and future as it addresses the War of Greek Independence, and sets 
contemporary political struggle in the context of a cyclical vision of historical and cosmic 
change.  Again, propaganda is held in abeyance.  In the final choral lyric, Shelley sets a 
cyclical view of history, according to which “The world’s great age begins anew” (1060), 
against a “weariness” induced by all cycles, “The world is weary of the past,” the poem 
finishes, “O might it die or rest at last!” (1100-1).  Once again, a Shelleyan poem concludes 
not in a state of final certitude, but on a more suspended note that awakens doubts and 
uncertainties.  Yes, the poem is partisan, but it sets the Greek struggle for liberty in the 
context of an awareness that all struggle might or must involve “hate and death” (1096) and 
that there may be an unbridgeable gulf between an immutable idea of Hellenic culture and its 
value, one “based on the crystalline sea / Of thought and its eternity” (698-9), and the 
actualities of contemporary conflict.  In “Ozymandias,” Shelley uses the sonnet-form not to 
monumentalize, but to declare the folly of all monuments, especially those built by tyrants in 
their own vainglorious self-praise. The poem itself must take the place of the sculptured 
wreck it interprets as an emblem of tyranny’s inevitable passing away, but how art is to avoid 
complicity with power is also a theme of the poem.  For one thing, the artist who “well those 
passions read” (6) was able to insinuate criticism even as he ostensibly affirmed tyrannical 
greatness. Thus art is always capable of freedom, even if the full realization of that freedom 
may lie in the minds of later beholders.  More disquietingly, though,  is the implicit question 
whether art’s creations are themselves subject to inevitable decay. Yet here, as he traces 
democratizing, erasing vistas of empty “sands” (14), Shelley hints at the ongoing role for 
poets, since their achievement is always in need of renewal, of rediscovery, and of recreation.  
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Cultural entropy is inevitable, we are told at the start of A Defence of Poetry, “and then, if no 
new poets should arise to create afresh the associations which have been thus disorganized, 
language will be dead to all the nobler  purposes of human intercourse” (Major Works 676).  
The drama and dynamism which this essay has sought to trace in Shelley’s poetry finds its 
eloquent apologia in these words by him.  In turn, his multifaceted influence on poets as 
diverse as Browning and T. S. Eliot bears witness to the fact that his work has gone on 
stimulating new and diverse forms of creativity. 
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